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Abstract
Pursuant to the same logic that prevailed when Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman reached
out to Germany after the end of World War II, and in keeping with the promise made in the
Preamble of the founding treaty, the EU now reached out to Central and Eastern Europe after
the end of the Cold War and offered integration. In recognition of the difficulties for the EU on
the one side of absorbing a large number of countries without jeopardizing the functioning of the
institutions, and the difficulties for the Central and Eastern European Countries (”CEECs”) on the
other side of transforming themselves into modern democracies with rule of law and functioning
market economies, a number of pre-conditions for accession and a number of support schemes for
the transformation were established. The present Article analyzes those pre-conditions that were
supposed to promote the development of rule of law, as well as those schemes that were intended
to support this development. It concludes that first, the concept of “rule of law,” although often
quoted, is poorly defined and understood and this is an obstacle for countries aspiring to build
a system based on rule of law. Second, Western support for the transformation in Central and
Eastern Europe was and continues to be a combination of trial and error with a lack of appreciation
of historic precedent and lessons.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Community for Coal and Steel (Paris, 1951),
as well as the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Rome, 1957), were created
first and foremost to secure peace and prosperity in Europe.2
Western Europe, to be precise, since the Central and Eastern
European Countries ("CEECs") were already prevented from
participating by the onset of the Cold War and their location in
the part of Europe that Churchill had so generously ceded to
,Stalin in Moscow and Yalta in 1944 and 1945.'
* John S. Grimes Professor Law and Director of the Center for International &
Comparative Law at Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. The author was
Dean of Concordia International University Estonia School of Law from 1998 to 2002
and a visiting professor at numerous law schools in Central & Eastern Europe and Central Asia; since 1993, he has been an advisor to a number of governmental and private
sector entities in Central and Eastern European Countries ("CEECs"), and a participant
in or organizer of a variety of projects funded by the European Union ("EU"), the
Council of Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("EBRD"), and others, for the promotion of rule of law in the region. Since 2007, the
author is directing a large United States Agency for International Development
("USAID") project for the promotion of rule of law in Egypt, testing whether some of
the lessons learned in the transformation in CEECs can be applied in other parts of the
world. Further information on the author is available from his Epsilen ePortfolio, available at http://femmert.iupui.epsilen.com/content/personal/universal/public/home/
index.aspx?pr=femmert. Questions or comments can be sent to femmert@iupui.edu.
1. See Ralph Nader, Green Party Presidential Candidate, Wasting Your Vote, Wasting Our Democracy (Aug. 23, 2000), http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/RalphNader/082300.html.
2. See ToNYJUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 157-58 (2005).
3. Churchill's strategy of buying Russian goodwill and acquiescence of British
dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean with territories in Central and South Eastern
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Western European integration achieved its primary purposes rather handsomely and by the mid-1980s, the Member
States of the Communities were not only experiencing an unprecedented standard of living but war between the arch-enemies Germany and France had become unthinkable. 4 But then
came the end of the Cold War and the challenge of extending
peace and prosperity to all of Europe. In this respect, the brutal
war that accompanied Yugoslavia's dismemberment from 1991
to 1999, 5 right in the backyard of the European Union ("EU"),6
provided a horrible reminder that in Europe peace must never
be taken for granted.
Pursuant to the same logic that prevailed when Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman reached out to Germany after the end
of World War II, 7 and in keeping with the promise made in the
Preamble of the founding treaty,' the EU now reached out to
Europe that were not his to give has been well documented. On the so-called "Percentages Agreement" see, for example, Roy JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A BIOGRAPHY 759-60
(2001);JuDT, supra note 2, at 101; Richard M. Ebeling, Covering the Map of the World: The
Half-Century Legacy of the Yalta Conference, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUNDATION, http:/
/www.fff.org/freedom/0495b.asp. In January 1945, before going to Yalta, Churchill
supposedly said "[m]ake no mistake, all the Balkans, except Greece, are going to be
Bolshevised, and there is nothing I can do to prevent it. There is nothing I can do for
Poland, either." JUDT, supra note 2, at 100.
4. See, e.g., Desmond Dinan, Fifty Years of EuropeanIntegration: A Remarkable Achieve-,
ment, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118, 1118 (2008). Indeed, (Western) Europe has never
before experienced a period of more than five decades without any major wars. See
Cristobal Alvarez, A Military History Timeline Of War And Conflict Across The Globe
3000 B.C. To A.D. 1999, http://www.warscholar.com/Timeline.html (last visited Nov.
1, 2008) (based on GEORGE C. KOHN, DICTIONARY OF WARS (1999)).
5. "Between 1991 and 1999 hundreds of thousands of Bosnians, Croats, Serbs and
Albanians were killed, raped or tortured by their fellow citizens; millions more were
forced out of their homes and into exile ... [there were] massacres and civil war on a
scale not seen since 1945." JUDT, supra note 2, at 665. For the magisterial work on
Yugoslavia's troubled political history see SABRINA P. RAMET, THE THREE YUGOSLAVIAS:
STATE BUILDING AND LEGITIMATION 1918-2005 (2006); for historic background see also
REBECCA WEST, BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON: A JOURNEY THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA
(1941).
6. Although technically not correct until the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force,
the term "European Union" shall be used throughout this article instead of "European
Community" for activities under the European Community Treaty ("ECT"), and the
proper "European Union" activities under the Treaty on European Union ("TEU").
7. SeeJUDT, supra note 2, at 156-57.
8. The original Preamble of the 1957 ECT reads as follows:
DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe,
RESOLVED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries
by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,
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Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and
offered integration.9 In recognition of the difficulties for the EU
on the one side of absorbing a large number of countries without jeopardizing the functioning of the institutions, and the difficulties for the CEECs on the other side of transforming themselves into modern democracies with rule of law and functioning
market economies, a number of pre-conditions for accession
and a number of support schemes for the transformation were
established.
The present Article analyzes those pre-conditions that were
supposed to promote the development of rule of law, as well as
those schemes that were intended to support this development.
It concludes that first, the concept of "rule of law," although
often quoted, is poorly defined and understood and this is an
obstacle for countries aspiring to build a system based on rule of
law. Second, Western support for the transformation in Central
and Eastern Europe was and continues to be a combination of
trial and error with a lack of appreciation of historic precedent
and lessons.
I. EVERYBODY AGREES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT
FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEBUT WHAT IS "RULE OF LAW?"
Although everybody talks about it all the time, few people
have provided and, indeed, few people seem to be able to provide a clear definition of what is meant by "rule of law."'" ThereAFFIRMING as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples
RESOLVED by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen
peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal
to join in their efforts.
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community pmbl., Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (emphasis added).
9. As Jacques Delors, former President of the EU Commission said, "Si nos gbnzrations ne rpondentpas au devoir qui est le leur aujourd'hui, d'itendre leurs valeurs de paix et de
comprihension mutuelle d l'ensemble de lEurope, elles failliront devant l'histoire." Jacques
Delors, Opening Session, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 15, 17 (Eur.
Comm'n ed., 1998).
10. The lack of a clear understanding of "rule of law" has been widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Hague Inst. For Internationalisation of Law, 2007 Rule of Law Inventory
Report (2007), available at http://www.hiil.org/uploads/File/1-947-Rule-ofLawInventoryReport_2007.pdf [hereinafter Rule of Law Inventory Report]. The report includes a
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fore, the first Part of this Article will be an attempt at a comprehensive and workable definition that should make future discussion of the subject less fuzzy and support more effective efforts at
promoting "rule of law" in certain countries and parts of the
world, including but not limited to Central and Eastern Europe.
What may be the first modern and systematic analysis of the
concept of "rule of law" was provided by the famous English ju-

rist A.V. Dicey in his landmark book

INTRODUCTION TO THE

in 1885.11 Dicey identifies three essential elements of "rule of law," namely: (1) no person can be punished or "lawfully interfered with" by the public
authorities unless the person is in breach of the law and that any
and all such interference by the government in private affairs
must be authorized by law; (2) no person is above the law and
that everyone, regardless of rank and status, is subject to the full
range of the ordinary laws of the land, and finally; (3) there is an
essential set of rights of the person based on general principles
of law, whether or not they are also expressed in the form of a
bill of rights. 2 As we will see, this definition remains remarkably
useful today.
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

Historically, the principle of rule of law evolved in opposition to arbitrary governance, either by a totalitarian ruler or
king, or by the mob. Hence it expresses first and foremost the
notion that nobody is above the law and that not only the people
but even their government must follow predetermined and publicly available rules. 3 The U.S. State Department, one of the bigbibliography on "rule of law" of almost 100 pages. Id. at 34. "Rule of law" is not alone in
this fate it seems. "Good governance" is another concept that is much used and little

defined. See Friedl Weiss, Transparency as an Element of Good Governance in the Practice of
the EU and the WTO: Overview and Comparison, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1545, 1547 (2007).
11. See generally A. V. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1961), available at http://www.constitution.org/cmt/avd/lawcon.
htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
12. See id. at 187-203.

13. For early examples see the MAGNA CARTA chs. 38"40, imposing certain limits on
King John of England, in particular with regard to the writ of habeas corpus, and the
philosophy embodied in SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEX, REX, OR, THE LAW AND THE PRINCE:

A DISPUTE FOR THE JUST PREROGATIVE OF KING AND PEOPLE (1843) in which he reverses
the previous paradigm of Rex Lex. Rutherford is said to have been influential on
Locke and America's founding fathers. See JOHN COFEY, POLITICS, RELIGION AND THE
BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: THE MIND OF SAMUEL RUTHERFORD 12 (1997). By contrast, the

absolute or absolutist monarch is exemplified by Louis XIV (1638-1715), the sun king,
who supposedly said of himself "l'Etat, c'est d moi," "the State is me," or "I am the State,"
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gest sponsors of "rule of law" promoting projects around the
world, claims that,
The rule of law suggests that if our relationships with each
other (and with the state) are governed by a set of relatively
impartial rules-rather than by a group of individuals-then
we are less likely to become the victims of arbitrary or authoritarian rule. Note here that the political obligation implied by
the rule of law applies not only to the rights and liberties of
subject and citizen but also with equal claim to rulers and
governors. By precluding both the individual and the state
from transcending the supreme law of the land, the framers
[of the Constitution] constructed
a protective layer over indi4
vidual rights and liberties.1
Other sources and organizations emphasize the significance
of a separation of powers and a system of checks and balances
between them. Equality before the law, democratic elections,
and free media are also often quoted as essential elements of the
rule of law, although this would seem to conflate or confuse democracy and rule of law. The following is also from the U.S.
State Department:
The rule of law is a fundamental component of democratic society and is defined broadly as the principle that all
members of society-both citizens and rulers-are bound by
a set of clearly defined and universally accepted laws. In a
democracy, the rule of law is manifested in an independent
judiciary, a free press and a system of checks and balances on
leaders through free elections and separation of powers
among the branches of government.
Although a written constitution is not a necessary component of democracy-for example, Great Britain does not have
one-in the United States, the rule of law is based primarily
on the U.S. Constitution and on the assurance that U.S.
laws-in conjunction with the Constitution-are fair and are
applied equally to all members of society.' "
See Herbert H. Rowen, "L'Etat C'est d Moi': Louis XIV and the State, 2 FRENCH HisT. STUD.
83, 83 (1961).
14. Greg Russell, Constitutionalism: American and Beyond, http://usinfo.state.gov/
products/pubs/democracy/drnpaper2.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
15. See Alexandra Abboud, The Rule of Law Provides Foundationfor Democracy (Jan.
18, 2006), http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/January/20060118165
638maduobbA8.491153e-02.html.
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It is doubtful whether Washington's traditional emphasis on
democracy, which can almost be summarized as "first introduce
democracy and everything else will take care of itself," is indeed
the best approach to the promotion of "rule of law" in other
parts of the world. At the very least, this emphasis would seem to
alienate the current government in an undemocratic country.
Instead of working with the powers that be for gradual change
and the development of "rule of law," Washington confronts undemocratic governments and labels them as the primary problem, thus denying them the opportunity to become part of the
solution.16
Yet other sources and organizations target the importance
of the judiciary for the rule of law. For example, the Center for
the Rule of Law in Boston1 7 declares that
The nature of the judicial system is critical to the rule of law.
Impartial judges, governed by clear legal rules, committed to
enforcing the rules as written, independent of political influence are essential if law is to be a reliable guide to individuals
and a constraint on those in power. The process for appointing judges to the courts needs to be removed from the
realm of ordinary politics, where attention is focused excessively on a judge's supposed ideology rather than on demonstrated competence and propriety. It is necessary if legal
rules are to be meaningful that judges are committed to applying laws written by others faithfully, and it is fair to ask if
nominees to the courts have conducted their professional
lives in a manner consistent with an expectation that they
would perform the law application task assigned to ourjudiciary. It is not, however, proper to ask nominees to signal that
they would support particular outcomes in certain cases. Judicial activism-the use of a judge's power to invent novel
legal requirements that suit personal policy preferences
rather than established legal commands-undermines the
rule of law. So does the demand that judges barter implicit
promises on future decisions for confirmation votes. In addi16. For further analysis see Frank Emmert, Market Economy, Democracy, or Rule of
Law? What Should Be Prioritized to Promote Development?, in CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROLAND BIEBER 104 (2007).
17. The Center is an independent academic research center chaired by Ronald A.
Cass, the Dean Emeritus of Boston University School of Law, former Vice-Chairman of
the United States International Trade Commission, and Chairman of the Federalist
Society Practice Group on International Law and National Security. See Center for the
Rule of Law: About Us, http://rule-of-law.us/about/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
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tion to the judges, the rules governing the operation of the
courts, the sorts of suits that courts will entertain, and the
18
procedures used all affect the vitality of the rule of law.

Again, we will have to see whether the judiciary does indeed
play such a preeminent role when it comes to rule of law and,
more importantly, which other elements of a legal system have
to be in place to enable the judiciary to play the role assigned to
it in this passage. In this respect, it will be argued that "rule of
law" is first and foremost in the hands of the public administration and that the courts can only play the role of goalkeepers
after the rest of the team has failed in its duties.
Then there are sources that seek to establish a necessary
link between "rule of law" and good governance. 19 The World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund-and many others
involved in law and development 2°-have long held that without
"rule of law" economic development will not and cannot be sustainable. 21 Consequently, these organizations have introduced
18. Center for the Rule of Law: Judicial System, http://rule-of-law.us/issues/udicial-system-international-business-trade/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). For an excellent discussion of the problems burdening the appointment ofjudges in the United States see
Symposium, Jurocracy and Distrust: Reconsidering the FederalJudicialAppointments Process,
26 CAitnozo L. REv. 331 (2005), with contributions by over a dozen nationally recognized scholars.
19. See, e.g., Declaration of G8 Foreign Ministers on the Rule of Law, http://www.
mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2007/g8dec.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). For
academic analysis see, for example, Harry Seldadyo et al., Governance and Growth Revisited, 60 Kviuos 279 (2007) (with further references).
20. On the "Law and Development Movement" of the 1960s and 1970s, see, for
example, David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and
Future, in THE NEW LAw AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74 (David
M. Trubek et al. eds., 2006), available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/trubek/RuleofLaw.pdf [hereinafter Trubek, Development Assistance]; Elliot M. Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of "Scholars in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 492 (1977);John Henry Merryman, ComparativeLaw and Social Change: On the
Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMp. L.
457 (1977); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv.
1062 (1974); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Note, The Lessons ofLaw-and-Development Studies,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995).
21. See generally Rule of Law Inventory Report, supra note 10; Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato's Statement at the Conclusion of his Visit to Chile (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/2004/pr04185.htm. These forces received a powerful boost with the fall of
Communism and the beginning of reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, which led to
the emphasis on "rule of law" in the transformation process and ultimately the present
Article.
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conditions into their financial aid packages that require adherence to key elements of "rule of law."2 2
The World Bank2" has used different definitions for the
term over time, and it is worth examining those a bit more
closely. During the 1990s, while Ibrahim Shihata was General
Counsel of the World Bank, "rule of law" meant that:
a) [T]here is a set of rules which are known in advance,
b) such rules are actually in force,
c) mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the
rules and to allow for departure from them as needed according to established procedures,
d) conflicts in the application of the rules can be resolved
through binding decisions of an independentjudicial or arbitral body, and
e) there are known procedures for amending
the rules when
24
they no longer serve their purpose.
More recently, however, after Ko-Yung Tung became General Counsel of the World Bank in 2000, the definition of "rule
of law" has shifted into the following:
(1) the government itself is bound by the law;
(2) every person in society is treated equally under the law;
(3) the human dignity of each individual is recognized and
protected by law; and
(4) justice is accessible to all.
The rule of law requires transparent legislation, fair laws, predictable enforcement, and accountable governments to maintain order, promote private sector growth, fight poverty, and
have legitimacy.25
What is immediately apparent is how Shihata's definition is
22. See, e.g., Memorandum from The European Bank for Reconstruction and Dev.,
Political Aspects of the Mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 4, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/insti/aspects.pdf.
23. Barron estimates that the World Bank has spent some US$2.9 billion on some
330 projects promoting "rule of law" around the world between 1990 and 2005. See
Gordon Barron, The World Bank & Rule of Law Reforms, 9 (Dev. Studies Inst., London
Sch. of Econ. and Political Sci., Working Paper No. 05-70, 2005), available at http://
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP70.pdf.
24. IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED EsSAYS 85 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991).
25. THE WORLD BANK, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
REFORM 2-3 (2004), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/exterual/default/NDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/01/000012009_20040301142827/Rendered/PDF/250820
040Edition.pdf.
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technical and neutral, while Tung's definition (re-)introduces a
variety of values and a considerable measure of vagueness.2
Some open-ended questions may illustrate the point: what is
'Justice?" 27 What are "fair laws?" What is "legitimacy?" Can a

government promote "rule of law" without promoting "private
sector growth?" What is the standard to be applied for "human
dignity" and equality? Is this a Western standard or a universal
standard? If it is universal, is the position of women in some
Islamic societies compatible with it?28 Finally, do we need to
open these cans of worms before we can have useful and effective promotion of "rule of law?" Or do we risk overburdening
the "rule of law" and turning it into the victim of its own success?
Similar to Ko-Yung Tung, yet other sources consider "rule of
law" as conditio sine qua non for the protection of human rights
and in particular the enforcement of rights.

29

26. In this context, Barron distinguishes formal definitions, which rely on objectively verifiable criteria and do not require adherence to any particular set of morals or
values, from substantive definitions, which include the formal criteria but also insist on
substantive qualities. See Barron, supra note 23, at 14.
27. On this point see, interalia, Stathis Banakas, A Global Concept ofJustice-Dreamor
Nightmare? Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or Righteousness Competing in Today's
World, 67 LA. L. REv. 1021 (2007).
28. Lest the reader jump to conclusions such as, "of course it is unacceptable that
women are still not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia," I shall give a more subtle example. Arab names frequently contain references to fathers, grandfathers and great
grandfathers. See Patronymic-Arabic, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patronymic#
Arabic (last visted Nov. 1, 2008). For example, the full name of an Egyptian by the
name of Mohamed may well be Mohamed Ahmed Ali Mohamed, with the second,
third, and fourth names referring to his male ancestors in direct line. The same rule
applies to women, i.e., the full name of Mohamed's wife may well be Fatima Ismael
Mohamed Ahmed, with her second, third, and fourth names referring to her male ancestors in direct line. At least in Egypt, it is not possible for either of them to include
the names of their mothers, grandmothers, or great grandmothers in their name. This
may seem discriminatory to readers in Western countries. However, we find a similar
system of patronymic surnames in Lithuania where the daughter of Paulauskas will have
the last name Paulauskait6 ("daughter of Paulauskas") until she gets married to
Adamkus, at which point her last name will become Adamkien6 ("wife of Adamkus").
See Lithuanian Name-Patronymic, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithuanian_name#
Patronymic (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). Similar patronymic systems of names continue to
exist in Iceland and the Faroe Islands. See Icelandic Name, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Icelandicname (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). In Iceland, ifJon Stefansson ("Jon, son
of Stefan") gets married to Katrin Vilhjalmsdottir ("Katrin, daughter ofVilhjalm"), their
daughter will have the last name Jonsdottir and not Katrinsdottir, and their son will be
Jonsson and not Katrinsson. See also Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Information on Icelandic Surnames, http://eng.domsmalaraduneyti.is/information/nr/125
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
29. For a good overview, see Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law:
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Most recently, a number of different organizations from different parts of the world have pooled their resources into the
World Justice Project, "a multinational, multidisciplinary initiative to strengthen the rule of law worldwide." ' One of the activities of the World Justice Project is the compilation of a worldwide "Rule of Law Index" in which the organizers hope to include one hundred countries in the next three years. 3' The
Index is supposedly going to be "the first index that examines
the rule of law comprehensively [while o] ther indices cover only
aspects of the rule of law, such as human rights, commercial law,
and corruption."3 2 The following elements will be evaluated:
" The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law.
* The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and
property.
" The process by which the laws are enacted, administered
and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient.
* The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by
competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or representatives, and judges who are of
sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the
makeup of the communities they serve.3 3
Given the broad range of organizations and individuals
from different disciplinary backgrounds, the broad range of the
criteria to be taken into consideration is hardly surprising. The
question that needs to be asked, and hopefully answered, is
whether this is not getting unnecessarily comprehensive and
complicated. Arguably, the criteria are not only hard to measure
but the organizers may well find numerous shortcomings even in
the most developed countries and may end up with results that
show that although some countries have more problems than
others, nobody is perfect. This in turn may actually provide excuses for some of the worst of the perpetrators along the logic "if
Whats the Relationship?, 36

L. 809 (2005); see also JEREMY MATAm FARRALL,
(2007).
30. About the World Justice Project, http://www.abanet.org/wjp/about.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2008).
31. See The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
32. Id.
33. Id.
GEO.J. INT'L

UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW
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even the United States does not do this or that, how can we possibly be expected to do so?"
Last but not least, the "rule of law" has also been made responsible for the proper functioning of a market economy. 4 In
this context we can identify an important movement that emphasizes private property rights as a key component for the development of a market economy and links effective protection of such
private property rights with "rule of law.""
If the "rule of law" is a bit of everything to everyone, this
would seem to explain at the same time its popularity as a slogan," as well as the fact that the concept is increasingly in dan-

ger of becoming so vague as to become useless.

7

This raises the

34. This can be traced as far back as Max Weber. See Trubek, Development Assistance,
supra note 20, at 74; see generally MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND
SOCIErv (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein, trans., 1954).
35. Interesting work in this direction has been initiated by Professor Robin P. Malloy, Director of the Center on Property, Citizenship, and Social Entrepreneurism at
Syracuse University College of Law. See Center on Property, Citizenship, and Social Entrepreneurism, http://www.law.syr.edu/academics/centers/clbe/pcse.aspx (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008). The link is also supported by the so-called theory of "New Institutional
Economics," which has identified poor protection of private property rights as one of
the most important factors hampering development and growth. See, e.g., Douglass C.
North, The New Institutional Economics and Development (Economics Working Paper
Archive ("EconWApA"), Working Paper No. 9309002, 1993), available at http://
129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf.
36. Brian Tamanaha, in his landmark study, On the Rule of Law, concludes that
governments around the world can agree on very little these days, possibly less than
ever before. Certainly there is no agreement about essential elements of democracy
outside of Western democratic states, and any and all attempts at a universal catalog of
human rights have either failed or resulted only in rather vague and non-binding declarations. Yet there seems to be one thing that everybody is able to endorse, namely that
"rule of law" is a good thing and that it benefits everyone. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON
THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1 (2004). For a good overview of the
literature on "rule of law" see generally Rule of Law Inventory Report, supra note 10. An
equally good overview of organizations and projects around the world promoting "rule
of law" is provided in The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretaiy-General on the Rule of
Law at the Nationaland InternationalLevels, delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/
63/64 (Mar. 12, 2008), availableat http://www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol
=A/63/64.
37. Barron wrote that
[T]he [rule of law] is put forward as the solution for an astonishingly wide
range of problems: it poses as the link between fledgling and consolidated
democracy; it promises to entrench human rights; it promises an end to violence and corruption; and it is a sine qua non for the foundations of a market
economy. But with meanings as diverse as these, one could be forgiven for
thinking that the [rule of law], in the end, means nothing at all.
Barron, supra note 23, at 2-3. The reader should note a difference in diction. While
Barron uses active language, i.e., the rule of law promises this or that, I have used passive
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question whether there is a way-or whether there are ways-of
defining "rule of law" in more tangible and useful ways without
falling into the trap of allowing-or even encouraging-the instrumentalization of "rule of law" by particular interests, 8 converting "rule of law" into "rule by law."3"
First, we need to recall the important distinction between
horizontal relations of private individuals or entities among each
other, and vertical relations of private individuals or entities with
the public administration or state authorities. "Rule of law" is
really about the latter, protecting the individual in her relations
with the authorities and demanding that all levels of government
always respect the law. More than anything, "rule of law" is
therefore about administrative law. A further step at conceptual
analysis is provided by Paul Craig, who emphasizes "the distinction between formal and substantive meanings of the rule of
law."4 ° In essence, he concludes as follows:
Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in
which the law was promulgated (was it by a properly
authorised person, in a properly authorised manner, etc.);
the clarity of the ensuing norm (was it sufficiently clear to
guide an individual's conduct so as to enable a person to plan
his or her life, etc.); and the temporal dimension of the enacted norm (was it prospective or retrospective, etc.). Formal
conceptions of the rule of law do not however seek to pass
judgment upon the actual content of the law itself. They are
not concerned with whether the law was in that sense a good
law or a bad law, provided that the formal precepts of the rule
of law were themselves met.4 1

Subsequently, Craig discusses substantive standards "based
language, i.e., the rule of law is expected to deliver this or that, indicating that I see the
rule of law more as a victim of unrealistic expectations than a con artist.
38. As Brian Tamanaha has pointed out, "[l]acking its own internal values or goals,
law will become an instrument of those who control and set the goals of the state."
Tamanaha, supra note 20, at 474. For an even more scathing indictment of certain
abuses by the West of the promotion of "rule of law" see generally UGo MATTEI & LAURA

(2008).
39. On the latter, see the very interesting study in RULE BY LAw: THE POLITICS
COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).

NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL

OF

40. Paul P. Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 467, 467 (1997). See also the attempt at developing a "rule of
law" "framework" in Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60
ADMIN.

L. REv. 647, 653-68 (2008).

41. Craig, supra note 40, at 467.
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on, or derived from, the rule of law"4 2 that can be used to analyze whether a law is indeed good or bad. Pursuant to Craig, the
formalists, like Joseph Raz, reject substantive value criteria because they would merely restate the obvious, namely that good
laws are better than bad ones.4 3 Consequently, Raz emphasizes a
distinction between rule of law and other values, such as "democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human
rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of
man."4 4 By contrast, proponents of a substantive approach to
"rule of law," such as Ronald Dworkin, demand that "rule of law"
must include these essential values, that there cannot be "rule of
law" without widespread respect for and enforcement of these
values.45 Although Craig's analysis of the two approaches to
"rule of law" may bring some structure to the discussion, it is also
clear that it does not introduce any new elements but mainly
launches a debate whether the coin has one or two sides.
In my view, the formal approach to "rule of law" is as underinclusive as the substantive approach is over-inclusive. In other
words, the formal approach is not sufficiently ambitious and
could get more out of "rule of law" than just formal legitimacy.
At the same time, the substantive approach is overly ambitious
and burdens "rule of law" with everything that comes in the
broadest sense under democracy, justice, human rights, and
good governance, with the inevitable result of premeditated failure. A "middle way" discussed by Craig tries to avoid the
shortfalls of either approach, and indeed brings us somewhat
closer to a clearer, more effective, and thus more useful definition of "rule of law." Here is another quote from Craig's seminal
article:
[In a more recent book by Joseph] Raz the core idea is the
"principled faithful application of the law." The major fea42. Id.
43. See id. at 468. See also the discussion by Craig of Dicey's concept of "rule of
law" in Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework at
470-74 and the critical approach taken by Roberto Mangabeira Unger at 474-77. Craig
counts both of these, together with Raz, as representatives of the formal approach to
"rule of law." See id. at 468, 470, 474.
44. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 Law Q. REv. 195, 196 (1977).
45. Craig cites Ronald Dworkin, in particular RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE
(1986), and RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), as a representative of

the substantive approach to "rule of law." See Craig, supra note 40, at 477-79. Supporting the latter are also Sir John Laws and Trevor Allan. See id. at 479-84.
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tures are "its insistence on an open, public administration of
justice, with reasoned decisions by an independent judiciary,
based on publicly promulgated, prospective, principled legislation." The principle of the rule of law is addressed to the
courts, legislature, and also other
bodies such as the police
46
and administrative authorities.
This definition opens a new way of looking at "rule of law"
that is not a traditional part of the Anglo-American discourse
and instead can be traced back, inter alia, to Hans Kelsen.4 7 It
finds its modern day manifestations in the administrative law traditions of France and Germany.48 It rests on three pillars:4" first,
any level of public administration, from the head of state and
government, legislature, and constitutional or supreme court, to
the lowest level of civil servant, requires a legal basis for any decision, decree, ruling, or action that actually or potentially affects
the interests of any party outside of the public administration
and/or uses public resources ("Vorbehalt des Gesetzes," liberally
translated as "requirement of legal basis").5o Second, every decision, decree, ruling, or action, as well as every legal basis, has to
be in conformity with every higher norm in the respective legal
system (" Vorrangdes Gesetzes," liberally translated as "requirement
of legality").51 Third, every decision, decree, or action of the executive that directly affects the interests of any party outside of
the public administration must be reviewable by an independent
46. Craig, supra note 40, at 484 (quoting JOSEPH

Do(1994)).
Knight trans., 1978). It is
not surprising thatJoseph Raz should be influenced by Kelsen. In his doctoral thesis he
dealt at length with Kelsen's theory of legal system and also a comparison between
Kelsen and Jeremy Bentham. See JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC

MAIN: ESSAYS ON THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 373-74
47. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 221-319 (Max

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM

44-120 (1970); see also R.C.

VAN

A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 185-200 (1991).
48. See generally ArieJansse Bok, JudicialReview ofAdministrativeDecisionsby the Dutch
Administrative Courts: Recours Objectif or Recours Subjectif? A Survey Including French and
German Law, inJJUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 153 (F. Stroink & E. van
der Linden eds., 2005); L. NEVILLE BROWN &JoHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(5th ed. 1998); MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: IN COMMON LAW
CAENEGEM, LEGAL HISTOR.

PERSPECTIVE

(1985).

49. In an earlier study, I added "sufficient transparency of the political process"
and "free and investigative media" as a fourth pillar. See Emmert, supra note 16, at 116.
However, I do not consider these elements as central to "rule of law." Instead, they are
part of a larger concept of Rechtsstaat because they protect the functioning of the political rather than the legal system.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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judiciary for conformity with the first and second principles in a
procedure that follows minimum standards of due process and
results in a reasoned and published decision ("Rechtsschutzprinzip," liberally translated as "requirement of judicial review"
or "access to justice") .52 1 shall argue that if these three principles are observed, there is "rule of law" and there is no need for
more specific or comprehensive criteria. However, the three
principles need to be explained and illustrated in turn.
The "requirement of legal basis" rests on the assumption
that all power inherently belongs to the people and any authority in a state or society draws its powers from the people. This
means that by default, all powers are with the people, the governed, unless they have been explicitly transferred by the people
to their government.5" In addition to the basic transfer of powers to the government as laid down by the people in their constitutions,5 4 in modern states such a transfer is usually done in the
formal ways of representative democracy, i.e., the people vote for
their elected representatives and the parliament then adopts the
respective legal bases for administrative and other acts. Without
such a transfer, however, there is no power of the government
and any binding decision, decree, ruling, or action of the government that does not rest on a direct or indirect transfer of
55
power from the people in the form of a legal basis is ultra vires.
If the legal basis of an act is an administrative decision or circular or any other delegated authority below the level of a law of
52. See id.
53. Interestingly, this idea is by no means limited to Western, let alone JudeoChristian societies and constitutions. On the basis of many passages in the Qur'an, for
example the 159th verse of the third surah and the 38th verse of the 42nd surah, many
Islamic scholars have concluded that "government by consent and council, must be
regarded as one of the fundamental clauses of all Qur'anic legislation relating to state-

craft."

92 n.122 (Muhammad Asad ed., 1980); see also
44-47 (1961).
pmbl. ("We the People of the United States"); GRUNDGESETZ

THE MESSAGE OF THE QUR'AN

MUHAMMAD ASAD, THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM

54. See U.S.

CONST.

[GG] [Constitution] pmbl. (F.R.G) ("the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law").
55. By contrast to the present author, the majority of German commentators seem
to limit the "requirement of legal basis" to important acts of the public administration,
in particular those that interfere with fundamental rights of individuals, which require a
legislative basis, while unimportant acts do not have to be based on an act of parlia-

ment. See Jost Pietzcker, Vorrang und Vorbehalt des Gesetzes, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 710
(1979); Christoph Gusy, Der Vorrang des Gesetzes, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 189 (1983).
There is no contradiction, however, since the concept of legal basis is wider than the
concept of legislative basis.
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parliament, this legal basis itself has to be traceable to its own
legal basis and ultimately to a legislative basis. This means that
not every legal basis has to be a legislative basis but every legal
basis ultimately bas to be grounded or based on a legislative basis, which in turn rests on a constitutional basis.
The "requirement of legality" is simply the "idea that the
administration must be compelled to observe the law"5 6 where
"the law" means any norm that is binding and applicable
in a
given case. This introduces the concept of the hierarchy of
norms. In this hierarchy, the individual and specific administrative act or decision has the lowest rank." On the next higher
level is the organizational or institutional rule on which the individual administrative act was based." For example, the police
officer demanding entry into a private residence for purposes of
search and seizure (an individual and specific administrative act)
performs her duties pursuant to an order given by a commanding officer or prosecutor. The commanding order is usually
based on a ruling by an independent judge or a court order,
which in turn is given in implementation of a more general legislative act that permits forcible entry for purposes of search and
seizure in a number of strictly defined cases. 9 The legislative act
itself has to be in conformity with the constitution, however, and
in particular the provisions on privacy and the protection of private property and family life that will be found more or less
clearly defined in the respective bill of rights.6" Finally, the constitutional guarantees, as worded in general and interpreted in
specific cases, must conform to whatever norms of international
law are applicable to the situation at hand, whether by nature of
ratification by the respective state of an international agreement
such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or because that state is bound by other norms
of international law, in particular those derived from customary
international law.61 The hierarchy of norms and the "strictly le56. BROWN & BELL, supra note 48, at 213.
57. See Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What
America Can Learn from Europe, and Vice-Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 648 (2006).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Gerrit Betlam & Andrh Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public International
Law and European Community Law Before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of the
Practiceof Consistent Interpretation,14 EUR. J. INr'L L. 569 (2003); Eric Stein, International
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gal pedigree,
i.e., the unbroken chain of legality, leads to two
specific obligations: first, the administrative officer has to actually apply the specific laws applicable to a case at hand; second,
she is prohibited from breaching the specific law or any of the
applicable higher laws or norms.
The "requirement of judicial review" by an independent judiciary is an emanation of the separation of powers and the idea
of checks and balances. The doctrine that every act of every
state authority that directly affects the rights and/or obligations
of third parties must be open to judicial review pursuant to a
general principle of law ("le respect de la l4galite') was established
by the French Conseil d'Etat in 1950.63 In Germany, Article
19(4) of the Basic Law of 1949 provides as follows: "Should any
person's rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts. 6 4 This provision has consistently been
broadly interpreted by the German Constitutional Court.6" A
very clear illustration can also be found in the case law of the
European Court of Justice.6 6 Although the European Parliament had not been mentioned as a possible applicant or defendant in the respective procedural provision, the Court held that
[T]he European Economic Community is a Community
based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity
with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty. [The respective articles of] the Treaty established a complete system of
legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court
of Justice to review the legality of [any] measures adopted by
Law in Internal Law: Toward Internalization of Central-EasternEuropean Constitutions?, 88
AM.J. INT'L L. 427 (1994).
62. See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20 (8th ed.
2000).
63. Conseil d'Etat (CE) [Highest Administrative Court] Feb. 17, 1950, 86949 (Fr.),
available at http://www.lexinter.net/JPTXT2/arret-ministre-del'agriculture-c-dame_
lamotte.htm.
64. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19 § 4 (F.R.G).
65. See, e.g., Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal
Constitutional Court] 35, 263 (F.R.G); id. 41, 23, id. 60, 253.
66. For an early analysis see W. Paul Gormley, The Significant Role of French AdministrativeJurisprudenceas Presently Applied by the Court of the European Communities, with Emphasis on the AdministrativeLaw Remedies Available to PrivateLitigants, 8 S.D. L. REv. 32, 32-36
(1963).
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the institutions.6 7

Several conditions have to be fulfilled in order to make this
judicial review effective. It is widely understood that judicial review cannot function unless certain minimum standards of due
process and transparency are guaranteed.6" However, I am arguing that the traditional standards like independence of the judiciary, competent and impartial judges, and equality of arms
before the courts are not as central as commonly presented.
The primary function of the courts in administrative law is the
enforcement of the first and second pillars of "rule of law." First,
the administration has to provide and the courts have to review
the legal basis of the act in order to verify that the administration
was empowered to act in a given case. If the administration does
not or cannot provide a legal basis, the act is null and void according to the requirement of legal basis. The same is true if
there is a legal basis but it does not support the act in question.
Second, the courts must verify whether the contested act is in
conformity not only with its legal basis but with all applicable
rules of law. Unless there is an unbroken chain of legality, all
the way up to constitutional and international guarantees of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the act is illegal and
has to be undone or compensated. To enforce the requirement
of legal basis and the requirement of legality, the courts merely
have to properly subsume the facts of the case under all applicable rules of law. And this in turn can be secured via two formal
conditions: access to the courts has to be guaranteed to any individual with a prima facie claim; and any decision of the courts
has to be fully reasoned and published for review by the parties,
any appellate level jurisdiction, and the interested public, in particular the media as well as any academic commentators. Last
but not least, a corollary of the "principle of judicial review" is
the principle of administrative liability, i.e., the obligation of the
administration to end a violation of individual rights or interests

67. Parti 6cologiste "Les Verts" (Fr.) v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986]
E.C.R. 1339 1 23. This principle would be violated, for example, if the Bush administration could successfully claim that its activities outside of U.S. territory, whether in Iraq
or in Guanatanamo Bay, are not subject to judicial review by U.S. courts.
68. See, e.g., Claudia Tobler, Note, The Standard ofJudicial Review of Administrative
Agencies in the US. and EU: Accountability and Reasonable Agency Action, 22 B.C. INLT' &
COMP. L. REv. 213, 215-19 (1999).
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found by a court in a judgment that becomes resjudicata and to
make good any damages unlawfully inflicted.
It is my conviction that these relatively few and simple preconditions are enough to develop "rule of law" not only in
CEECs seeking or having recently obtained EU membership, but
in any country around the world, with the sole exception of failing states where there is neither rule nor law but only chaos.
This conviction is based on the assumption that systems meeting
these pre-conditions or criteria become self-regulating or autopoietic.6 9 In other words, rather than looking for foolproof systems, as seems to be the goal of the World Justice Project, I am
advocating systems that acknowledge their inherent faults, in
particular human faults such as the occasional biased or corrupted judge, and provide mechanisms to correct these faults.
Constitutions are usually beautiful documents that promulgate
respect for human rights, justice, and equality even in otherwise
quite undeveloped countries.7 0 And even where they have gaps
or ambiguities, international law can often supplement the necessary guidance. Therefore, if the public administration cannot
act without a constitutional legal basis and all acts must be
strictly legal in light of the constitution and any applicable
norms of international law, gradual evolution of "rule of law"
depends only on effective legal remedies. And if the courts have
to grant access and have to explain what they are doing to enforce the "rule of law," national and international public opinion
will over time lead to better and better decisions. This process
may be slow and it may not protect every injured party but even
the bad examples will still serve a purpose.
In the next Part, we shall examine to what extent the preconditions of "rule of law" as here presented were part of the
conditions of accession for the candidate countries and to what
extent-if any-the EU supported this kind of development of
"rule of law."

69. On the concept of autopoietic social systems see NriLAS LUHMANN, ESSAYS ON
1-20 (1990). The application of Luhmann to law has been accomplished by Gunther Teubner. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM
(Zenon Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowska et al. trans., 1993).
70. A fine example is the modern and democratic 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.
See generally PAKISTAN CONST., available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
SELF-REFERENCE
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II. EU SUPPORT FOR THE TRANSFORMATION IN CEEC's
AS SUPPORT FOR "RULE OF LAW?"
During the Cold War, the European Union had very limited
relations with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. For
a long time, the EU in Western Europe and the Comecon 7 1 in
Central and Eastern Europe did not even recognize each other,
leaving bilateral relations to the level of the Member States.7 2
Only after the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, did
relations between the two economic organizations begin to normalize and direct negotiations were initiated. 73 As the reform
process in the Soviet Union gained momentum and the CEECs
gradually regained their full sovereignty, these countries rapidly
sought closer relations with the EU and with the Member States
of the EU.7 ' The communist leadership in Hungary, seeking to
appease pressure for reform, began negotiations with democratic reform movements and started with the removal of its fortifications along the border with Austria in May 1989. 7 ' The
trickle of East Germans escaping via Hungary to the West grew
rapidly. 76 Against the background of economic decline and
striking workers, a weakened communist leadership in Poland
accepted round-table talks with representatives of the Solidarity
labor union as early as February 1989 and after the elections in
June 1989 the first non-communist government in the region
71. "Comecon" stands for Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also abbrevi-

ated as CMEA. For more information on this Soviet-dominated counterpart to the European Economic Community ("EEC"). See Comecon, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Comecon (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
72. See generally Barbara Lippert, EG-CMEA Relations: Normalisation and Beyond, in
EUROPE'S GLOBAL LINKS: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION

119 (Geoffrey Edwards et al. eds., 1990).
73. Official relations were established in June 1988. See Legislative Resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a decision on the conclusion of
the Joint Declaration on the establishment of official relations between the European
Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA"),
o.J. C 187/148 (1988).
74. See generally Lippert, supra note 72.
75. SeeJut)T, supra note 2, at 609-10, 612. Hungary had ratified the UN Convention on Refugees in March 1989. See Status of Ratifications for Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees (Feb. 5, 2002), http://ww.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2
ref.htm.
76. SeeJuDT, supra note 2, at 612.
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came to power in Poland in September 1989. 77 During the same
month, some 30,000 East Germans managed to escape via Hungary and via West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw, putting enormous pressure on the communist governments in
Czechoslovakia and in East Berlin. 78 This exodus only grew in
October and the communist leadership in East Germany finally
resigned as the Berlin Wall was broken down in November.7 9
More than anything, this event marked the fall of the iron curtain and the reunification of Europe.8"
The EU did its share to bring about and support the early
reform movements in Central and Eastern Europe.8 At the
Rhodes European Council in December 1988, the heads of state
and government of the twelve Member States took a strategic
decision to develop economic cooperation and to provide economic aid to those CEECs who were embarking on a reform
course.8 2 This approach was reinforced at the Strasbourg summit in April 1989, when the heads of state and government decided to coordinate their national strategies for the development
of relations with CEECs and to speak with one voice in this regard.8 3 In June 1989, the Vice President of the European Commission, Frans Andriessen, declared in Moscow that the EU
would use all policy instruments available to it to promote the
reforms in CEECs and this invitation was accepted by Gorbachev,
who spoke of a new Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals at a
speech before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in July of
77. See id. at 606-07. Solidarity had won all 161 contested seats in the Parliament
(Sejm) and 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate. See id. at 607; see also PUSHING BACK THE
BOUNDARIES: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 328-30 (Mike
Mannin ed., 1999) (delineating events in timeline format).

78. SeejuDT, supra note 2, at 612-13.
79. See id. at 610-16. Other important events include the installation of the first
non-communist government in Prague in December 1989 and the violent overthrow of
communist dictator Ceaucescu in Romania during the same month. See id. at 616-26.
80. For an excellent analysis of the period, see TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, IN EUROPE'S
NAME: GERMANY AND THE DIVIDED CONTINENT 343-56 (1993) andJUDT, supra note 2, at

585-633.
81. For a good overview see, for example, Antoaneta Dimitrova, The Role of the EU
in the Process of Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, in
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 9, at 315.
82. See European Council, Rhodes, 2 and 3 December, 21 E.C. BULL., no. 12 at 813 (1988), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1483/01/rhodes-june-1988.pdf.
83. See European Council, Strasbourg, 8 and 9 December, 22 E.C. BULL., no. 12 at
8-18 (1988), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1395/01/Strasbourg-1989.pdf.
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that same year.8" The heads of state and government of the
Group of Seven ("G7") then decided to set up economic support
programs for Hungary and Poland and the European Commission launched its famous Poland and Hungary: Assistance for
Restructuring their Economies ("PHARE") program.8 5 In parallel, the first bilateral agreements on trade cooperation between
the EU on the one side and Poland and Hungary on the other
side, were signed in late 1989 and 1992 respectively.8 6 From
there, it was a short way to the first association agreements with
CEECs that, unlike earlier agreements of association with other
countries,8 7 explicitly stipulated the goal of eventual member-

84. See Money, Business Roundup, Soviet-EC Talks Planned, WASH. TIMES, June 9,
1989, at C1. Gorbachev actually used the words "We are thinking of an all-European
home as a community rooted in law." Mikhail Gorbachev, Address given to the Council
of Europe (July 6, 1989), available at http://www.ena.lu/mce.swf?doc=1 11 60&lang=2.
85. See Council Regulation No. 3906/89, OJ. L 375/11 (1989), availableat http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31989R3906:EN:HTML.
PHARE stands for "Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies." See The Phare Programme And The Enlargement Of The European Union, EUR.
PARL. Doc. (PE 167.944) 4 (1998), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/pdf/33al-en.pdf. For the first year, 1990, financial aid of 300 million
Euro was approved. This program was subsequently expanded to cover all ten CEECs
that have since become members of the EU and was updated annually. See id. Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia at one point also benefited from PHARE aid, but
have since, together with the other successor states of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, received their own program, "Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans" ("CARDS"). See Council Regulation No. 2666/2000,
O.J. L 306/1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
L:2000:306:0001:0006:EN:PDF; Marc Maresceau, Pre-accession, inTHE ENLARGEMENT OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 9, 35 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003).
86. See Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Polish
People's Republic on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, O.J. L 339/2
(1989), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
21989Al122(01):EN:HTML; Interim Agreement between the European Economic
Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the
Republic of Hungary, of the other part, on trade and trade-related matters, O.J. L 116/
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
2 (1992),
CELEX:21992A0430(03):EN:HTML; Commission Decision of 27 February 1992 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Coal and Steel Community of the
Interim Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European
Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other
part, on trade and trade-related matters, O.J. L 151/25 (1992), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31992D0289:EN:HTML.
87. The only earlier association agreement that stipulated the goal of membership,
albeit only after a lengthy transitional period, was the 1964 Agreement establishing an
Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, OJ.217/3687 at
art. 28 (1964), available at http://www.cfcu.gov.tr/files/AnkaraAnlasmasi.doc.
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ship in the EU.8 8 At the European Council in Copenhagen in
June 1993, the heads of state or government of the EU Member
States "agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union," 9 an invitation that was received with enthusiasm
in the CEECs. Multiple applications for membership in the EU
followed suit.9"
At the time when the CEECs applied for membership in the
EU it was quite clear that both the candidate countries themselves and the institutional structure of the EU would need substantial reforms before the enlargement could be completed. 9 '
Without these reforms or with incomplete preparation, an enlargement to the East could have done more damage than good.
Already the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, therefore,
formulated a number of conditions to be achieved before accession:
88. See, for example, the Europe Agreement establishing an association between
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic
of Hungary, of the other part, OJ. L 347/271 (1993), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21993A1231(17) :EN:HTML.
This agreement was signed on December 16, 1991 and, after ratification by the twelve
Member States of the EU and by Hungary, entered into force on February 1, 1994. See
EUR-Lex Database, Dates, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=195678:cs&lang=en
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
89. See European Council in Copenhagen: Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93
REV 1, at 13 (1993), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms-Data/
docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf [hereinafter European Council in Copenhagen].
90. Hungary was first to apply in March 1994, followed by Poland in April 1994.
Romania and Slovakia applied in June 1995, Latvia in October 1995, Estonia in November 1995 and Bulgaria and Lithuania in December 1995. Finally, the Czech Republic
applied in January 1996 and Slovenia in June 1996. SeeJOHN O'BRENNAN, THE EASTERN
ENLARGEMEN'T OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 190 n.7 (2006).
91. To get an idea about the institutional problems of enlargement, with regard to
issues such as translation and interpretation to and from the new languages, buildings,
etc., see Commission of the European Communities, Administrative Preparations for
Enlargement: Objectives and Practical Arrangements: Working Paper from the Commission Staff, SEC (2001) 1319 Final (July 2001), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/4399/
01/001826l1.pdf; Guido Podesta, Preparing for the Parliament of the Enlarged European Union, PE 305.269/BUR/fin (Sept. 10, 2001);John Peterson, Enlargement, Reform
and the European Commission: Weathering a Perfect Storm?, 15 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 761
(2008). Regarding the institutional capacity and issues of decision-making see, for example, Ingolf Pernice, InstitutionalSettlements for an EnlargedEuropean Union, in LAw AND
GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION

3 (George A. Bermann & Katharina

Pistor eds., 2004); Eric Philippart and Monika Sie Dhian Ho, PedallingAgainst the Wind:
Strategies to Strengthen the EU's Capacity to Act in the Context ofEnlargement (Scientific Council for Gov't Policy, Working Paper No. 115, 2001), available at http://www.wrr.nl/english/contentjsp?objectid=3205.
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Membership requires that the candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes
the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union.
The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while
maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also
interest of both
an important consideration in the general
92
the Union and the candidate countries.

It would be beyond the scope of the present Article to analyze all of the conditions in any kind of detail.9 3 Instead, the
focus shall be on democracy, rule of law, and "the ability to take
on the obligations of membership." The latter, in particular, has
been interpreted as the ability to apply the acquis communautaire,
i.e., the rights and obligations enshrined in the general principles of law, the founding treaties, the regulations, directives and
decisions forming the secondary legislation in force, as well as
the international agreements, and the case law of the European
Court of Justice, that together constitute the body of law that we
commonly call "EU law."9' 4 This means in addition to various
political and economic reforms,9 5 the CEECs had to undergo a
process of institutional and legal reform encompassing five cen92. See European Council in Copenhagen, supra note 89, at 13.
93. It would also be quite unnecessary, as there are many good publications on the

subject. See, e.g.,

HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT:

A COMMENTARY ON THE EN-

(Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis eds., 2002); Tibor Paldnkai, From Europe Agreements to Membership: What CriteriaShould be met and the Prospectsof Meeting Them,
supra note 9, at 339; RogerJ. Goebel,
in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD,
Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedurefor the Central European and Mediterranean States, I Lov. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 15 (2003-04).
94. See Frank Emmert, IntroducingEU Competition Law and Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: Requirements in Theory and Problems in Practice, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 642, 642
n.1 (2004).
95. The literature on economic reforms in CEECs is vast. See, e.g.,JiM ROLLO, EcoLARGEMENT

PROCESS

nomic Aspects of EU Enlargement to the East, in

ENLARGING THE EUROPEAN UNION: RELA-

(Marc Maresceau ed.,
1997); Roland Sturm, Markus M. Mfller &Jfirgen Dieringer, Economic Transformationin
Central and Eastern Europe: Towards a New Regulatory Regime?, 7 J. EUR. PUB. POL'y 650,
650-62 (2000).

TIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 252

2009]

RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 575

tral elements: (1) constitutional reform;9 6 (2) legislative reform;

(3) court reform; (4) administrative reform; as well as (5) reform of legal education. We shall now examine by what means
the European Union supported the candidate countries in these
reforms and to what extent the support actually encouraged the
development of "rule of law."
As pointed out, the first expression of admission criteria beyond the laconic language in the Treaties came out of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. However, it did not go
beyond generalizations such as "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law [and] human rights" as well as
"the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership."9" The same is true for the Essen European Council of
1994, which at least instructed the Commission to come up with

a White Paper on enlargement.9 9 In the same tradition of being
vague and general, in December 1995, the Madrid European
Council concluded that the "the pre-accession strategy ...

will

have to be intensified in order to create the conditions for the
gradual, harmonious integration of those States, particularly
through the development of the market economy [and] the adjustment of their administrativestructures . . . .""'
Similar declarations followed in six month intervals at every European Council
10 1
as sure as one season follows after another.
96. See CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
(Rein Mfil1erson et al. eds., 1998); WOJCIECH SADUPSKI, TransitionalConstitutionalism: Simplistic and Fancy Theories, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 9
(Adam Czarnota et al. eds., 2005); Istvan Pogany, Constitutional Reform in Central and
Eastern Europe: Hungary's Transition to Democracy, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 332 (1993); Eric
Stein, Post-Communist Constitution-Making: Confessions of a Comparatist (Part 1), 1 NEW
EUR. L. REv. 421 (1993).
97. See generally Goebel, supra note 93.
98. See generally European Council in Copenhagen, supra note 89.
99. See European Council, Essen, 9 and 10 December, 27 E.C. BULL., no. 12 at 22
(1994), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1447/01/EssenDec_1994.pdf.
100. European Council, Madrid, 15 and 16 December, 28 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 18
(1995) (emphasis added), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1452/01/madrid-dec1995.
pdf. For a detailed history of the European Council meetings and other steps in the
pre-accession phase see PHEDON NICOLAIDES, ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
EUROPE

AND EFFEcrIvE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RULES: WITH A CASE STUDY ON TELECOMMUNICA-

(2000).
101. For details see, for example,

TIONS

DEREK BEACH, THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTE-

MATTER 214-44 (2005); DESMOND DINAN,
A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 271-79 (2004); Phedon Nicolaides,
Preparingfor Accession to the European Union: How to Establish Capacity for Effective and
GRATION:

WHY AND WHEN

EUROPE RECAST:

EU

INSTITUTIONS
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The 1995 Commission's White Paper" 2 was the first attempt
at a more comprehensive "pre-accession strategy." As the name
suggests, the focus of the strategy was on preparations for participation in the internal market with its free flow of goods, services,
people, and capital. The White Paper also acknowledged, however, that
[A] merely formal transposition of legislation will not be
enough to achieve the desired economic impact or to ensure
that the internal market functions effectively after further enlargement. Accordingly, equal importance is attached to the
establishment of adequate structures for implementation and
enforcement, which may be the more difficult task.' 03
However, when going through the White Paper with a fine
comb, we find precious little that would deal with administrative
and other structures. Instead, the focus is on the adoption of
legislation in the different sectors relevant to the internal market
and some advice on sequencing of that legislative revolution.
This means the EU approached the CEECs as it would have approached just another Western candidate country, largely assuming that once the good Western laws are in place everything else
will soon follow.1" 4
Specific elements in the pre-accession strategy were the Europe Agreements for association of the CEECs, and the so-called
"structured relationship" of the candidate country governments
with the institutions of the EU. t°5 The focus of the Europe
Credible Application of EU Rules, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra
note 85, at 43, 4546.
102. See Commission of the European Communities, Preparation of the Associated
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of
the Union: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (95)
163 Final (March 1995) [hereinafter White Paper], available at http://aei.pitt.edu/
1120/01/east.enlargwpCOM_95_163.pdf; see also O'BRENNAN, supra note 90, at 28;
Enlargement of the European Union: Summary of the White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.
103. See White Paper, supra note 102, at 2.
104. In subpoints 4.27 to 4.34, on exactly two pages, the White Paper laments the
difficulties experienced by CEECs in creating the necessary administrative structures for
the implementation and enforcement of EU law. Id. at 29-31. The bottom line is clearly
that everything will be achieved gradually as the resources for hiring and training of
qualified staff become available. For further analysis see, for example, MARC-ANDRE
GAUDISSART & ADINDA SINNAEVE, The Role of the White Paperin the Preparationof the Eastern
Enlargment, in ENLARGING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 95, at 41.
105. See Goebel, supra note 93, at 21-25; see, e.g., Europe Agreement establishing
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Agreements was again on the development of market access, i.e.,
the expansion of the fundamental freedoms in the EU internal
market plus supporting policies such as competition policy to
the CEECs via reform of substantive law, and not on the development of the legal cultures of the candidate countries." 6 Via the
"structured relationship" and the chapters in the Europe Agreements about political dialogue and the creation of Association
Councils some headway was made toward the integration of the
highest level of government in the CEECs into the institutional
and decision-making process in the EU.' °7 But this also did not
suggest, let alone require, any specific changes of administrative
law or culture in the candidate countries. 10 8
The negotiations for membership were opened for the first
five countries in 1998 and with the remaining candidates in
19 9 9

.1° ' The different areas to be covered in the negotiations

were divided into thirty-one chapters,1 10 roughly parallel to the
structure of the EC Treaty.'11 The CEEC governments then organized their national pre-accession strategies along the same
outline and the Commission documented the progress of the negotiations in annual progress reports." 2 Whenever a country
an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the
one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part, O.J. L 68/3 (1998), availableat
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L: 1998:068:0003:0187:
EN:PDF.
106. See Goebel, supra note 93, at 21-25.
107. See id.
108. A comprehensive and critical analysis of the problems can be found in Frank
Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, 9 EUR. L. J. 288
(2003) [hereinafter Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform]. Various problems of effective application of (European Union) law in CEECs are also discussed in Emmert,
supra note 94.
109. See Goebel, supra note 93, at 30.
110. See European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement, Enlargement of
the European Union-Guide to the Negotiations Chapterby Chapter (2003), available at http:/
/ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/enlargement-process/future-prospects/
negotiations/eu 10.bulgaria_romania/ negotiationsguide-en.pdf.
111. See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, OJ. C 325/33 (2002), as amended by the Treaty of Nice, Mar. 10, 2001, OJ.
C 80/1 (2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:C:2002:325:0001:0184:EN:PDF.
112. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Composite Paper: Reports on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (1999) [hereinafter Reports on Progress], available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/
pdf/key-documents/1999/compositeen.pdf; Commission of the European Communities, Making a Success of Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report on the Progress
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had either accepted to apply all parts of the acquis communautaire
covered by a specific chapter as of day one of membership in the
EU or had obtained agreement by the Commission on selected
transitional periods, the negotiations in that chapter were closed
for that country.' 1 3 Most of the time, several but not all thirtyone chapters were negotiated simultaneously. 1 4 In October
2002, this screening and negotiating process was largely completed and the Commission recommended to the Council that
accession agreements should be signed with eight of the ten
CEECs with the goal of completing ratifications and actual accession before the elections to the European Parliament in June
2004."1 Bulgaria and Romania were recommended for membership in 2007.116

During the negotiations it became increasingly clear that
the CEECs had difficulties reforming their courts and public administrations. This led to complaints by the Commission in the
annual progress reports and the adoption of an Action Plan for
Administrative andJudicial Capacity." 17 In addition to the finan-

cial support provided via PH-ARE,"

8

the EU developed Acces-

Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (2001), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/keydocuments/2001/strategy-en.pdf.
113. See Reports on Progress, supra note 112, at 32.
114. See id. at 41-48.
115. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Opinion of 19
February 2003 on the applications for accession to the European Union by the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of
Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, O.J. L 236/3 (2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:236:0003:
0004:EN:PDF. For the individual country reports, see Documents concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the
European Union, O.J. L 236/1 (2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.
do?textfield2=236&year=2003&Submit=Search&serie=L.
116. See Commission of the European Communities, Monitoring report on the
state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania, COM (2006) 549
Final (Sept. 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/keydocumen ts/2006/sept/report -bgro_2006_en.pdf.
117. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission on the Action Plan for administrative and judicial capacity, and the monitoring of commitments made by the negotiating countries in the accession negotiations, COM(2002) 256 Final (June 2002), [hereinafter Action Planfor administrativeand
judicial capacity], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=
COM:2002:0256:FIN:EN:PDF.
118. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Financial support for agriculture
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sion Partnerships with the candidate countries, provided more
and more money for re-development of physical facilities and
training of staff of the public administrations, and encouraged
bi-national twinning programs. 119
These measures have been summarized by Phedon Nicolaides as "M&M solutions, ' 12° where the abbreviation stands for
"money & men." In short, the EU works on the assumption that
all it takes for the effective application of EU law in the new
Member States is the appointment of sufficiently large numbers
of sufficiently qualified staff and whatever resources they need.
In contrast to the "official" emphasis on knowledge and ability,
Nicolaides suggests a focus on the willingness of the people in the
new Member States, from the top officials via the average administrators and judges, to the population in general, to comply with
EU law and "rule of law." 12 1 Roland Bieber has done some good
but little noticed work on this matter.1 22 He seems more optimistic than me. As one of the participants on both sides of the
room, I have criticized the various training and twinning programs before and won't repeat myself here. 123 And why would I,
the reader may ask. After all, the ten CEECs have all joined the
EU in the meantime, the world has not come to an end, and
isn't all's well that ends well?
Well, apparently not. At least if the rapidly growing literature about different legal and administrative cultures in Eastern
124
and Western Europe and the resulting compliance problems
was provided under the Special accession programme for agriculture and rural development ("SAPARD") scheme and the structural funds were opened to the CEECs in the
framework of the Pre-Accession Structural Instrument ("ISPA") scheme. See Council
Regulation No. 1266/99, O.J. L 161/68 (1999), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L: 1999:161:0068:0072:EN:PDF.
119. See Action Planfor administrativeand judicial capacity, supra note 117, at 6.
120. See Nicolaides, supra note 101, at 44.
121. See id.; see also Dionysia Tamvaki, The Copenhagen Criteria and the Evolution of
PopularConsent to EU Norms: From Legality to NormativeJustifiability in Polandand the Czech
Republic, in SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAw? THE IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
LEGAL ORDERS

IN POST-COMMUNIST

149 (Wojciech Sadurski et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter

SPREADING DEMOC-

RACY].

122. See Roland Bieber & Micaela Vaerini, Implementation and Compliance: Stimulus

for New Governance Structures in the Accession Countries, in
ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 91, at 387.

LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN AN

123. See Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform, supra note 108, at 305-06.

124. See, e.g., Miroslav Beblavy, Management of Civil Service Reform in Central Europe,
in

MASTERING DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS IN CENTRAL AND
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and the equally rapidly growing literature complaining about
the courts in CEECs 1 25 are any indicators, then "rule of law" is
still wanting in this part of the world.12 6 And if this is indeed
true, then it should be reason for reflection in Brussels why all
the money that was spent over fifteen years on M&Ms has apparEASTERN EUROPE 55 (Gdbor P~teri ed., 2002); Adam Czarnota, Barbarians ante portas or
the Post-Communist Rule of Law in Post-Democratic European Union, in SPREADING DEMOCRAcy, supra note 121, at 283; Michal Bobek, A New Legal Order, or a Non-Existent One?
Some (Early) Experiences in the Application of EU Law in Central Europe, 2 CROATIAN Y.B.

EUR. L. & POL'Y 265, 269 (2006); Klaus H. Goetz, Making Sense of Post-Communist Central
Administration: Modernization, Europeanizationor Latinization?,8 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 1032,
1035 (2001); Klaus H. Goetz & Hellmut Wollmann, Governmentalizing CentralExecutives
in Post-Communist Europe: A Four-Country Comparison, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 864, 865
(2001); Heather Grabbe, How Does EuropeanizationAffect CEE Governance? Conditionality,
Diffusion and Diversity, 8J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 1013, 1014-15 (2001);Joel Hellman, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV.
71, 72 (1998); 'Wade Jacoby, The Reality Behind the Potemkin Harmonization: Priest and
Penitent-The European Union as a Force in Domestic Politics of Eastern Europe, 8 E. EUR.
CONST. REv. 63, 63-64 (1999); Zden6k Kfihn, Application of EuropeanLaw in CentralEuropean Candidate Countries, 28 EUR. L. REv. 551, 553 (2003); Barbara Lippert, Gaby Umbach & Wolfgang Wessels, Europeanization of CEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations
as a Shaping Power, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 980, 991 (2001); Siniga Rodin, Discourse and
Authority in European and Post-Communist Legal Culture, 1 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL'Y
1, 6-7 (2005); Ulrich Sedelmeier, After Conditionality: Post-Accession Compliance with EU
Law in East Central Europe, 15 J. EUR. PUB. POLY 806 (2008); Martina Spernbauer,
Benchmarking, Safeguard Clauses and Verification Mechanisms-What's in a Name? Recent Developments in Pre-and Post-accessionConditionality and Compliance with EU Law, 3 CROATIAN
Y.B. EUR. L. & POL'y 273, 297-302 (2007); Dimiter Toshkov, In Search of the Worlds of
Compliance: Culture and Transposition Performance in the European Union, 14 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y 933 (2007).
125. See, e.g.,
Zden~k Kfihn, The Instrumental Use of Basic Rights by the StalinistJudiciary, in ABUSE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 99 (AndrAs Saj6 ed., 2006);
Daniel Smilov, EU Enlargement and the ConstitutionalPrinciple ofJudicial Independence, in
SPREADING DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 313; Sergio Bartole, Alternative Models ofJudicial Independence: Organizingthe Judiciay in Central and EasternEurope, 7 E. EUR. CONST.
REv. 62, 63 (1998); Tamara Eapeta, Courts, Legal Cultures and EU Enlargement, 1 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL'Y 23, 23-24 (2005); Zden6k Kfihn, EuropeanLaw in the Empires of
MechanicalJurisprudence: TheJudicialApplication of EuropeanLaw in Central European Candidate Countries, I CROATIAN YB. EUR. L. & POL'Y 55, 56 (2005); Zdenek Kfihn, Worlds
Apart: Western and Central EuropeanJudicial Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2004); Open Soc'y Inst., Monitoring the EU Accession
Process: Judicial Independence (2001), http://www.eumap.org/reports/2001/judicial.
126. For an interesting study on how corruption is blamed for everything that is
not working properly in CEEC courts and administrations see Ivan Krastev, Corruption,

Anti-Corruption Sentiments, and the Rule of Law, in

RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER
COMMUNISM, supra note 96, at 323. My own reflections on the incompetence of some

judges in CEECs that is widely misunderstood as corruption can be found in Frank
Emmert, The Independence ofJudges: A Concept Often Misunderstood in Central and Eastern
Europe, 3 EUR. J. L. REFORM 405, 406 (2001).
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ently not bought us all that much. Last but not least, if the EU
would have to acknowledge that the strategies so far pursued
(alone) did not achieve the desired results, it should ask itself
two equally important questions: (1) what could be done in
those countries that have already achieved membership in the
EU to support development of "rule of law" and (2) how should
the support strategies for current and future candidates, as well
as neighbors, 127 be amended in light of these findings?
127. Although European integration should per se be open to any European country, the EU has recently begun to divide the remaining European countries into "candidates" and "potential candidates." See European Commission on Enlargement: Potential
Candiate Countries, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate-countries/
index-en.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). The actual and potential candidates are now
benefitting from the new Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance ("IPA"). See Council
Regulation No. 1085/2006/EC, O.J. L 210/82 (2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:210:0082:0093:EN:PDF.
Pursuant
to this document, there are three candidates (Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey) and four
potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia including Kosovo). The European Neighborhood Policy, by contrast, covers a number of European countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and a number of nonEuropean neighbors (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia). See Commission of the European Communities, European
Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM (2004) 373 Final (May 2004) available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
strategy/strategy-paper.en.pdf. Support under the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange ("TAIEX") program is available to the potential candidates, the neighbors, and to the Turkish Cypriot Community and Russia. See About TAIEX, http://
taiex.ec.europa.eu/abouttaiex.asp?lang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). TAIEX typically
provides Western experts to address challenges in the partner countries related to
adoption and implementation of modern legislation that is compatible with EU goals
and laws. See id. The bulk of the activities is done in the format of seminars, expert
reports, and study visits. Very few if any of the activities specifically address the issues
discussed in this Article. See EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TAIEX AcrivITY REPORT (2007),
http://taiex.ec.europa.eu/Library/ActRep2007/TAIEXActivityReportEN.pdf;
see also
Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of the European Economic and
Social Committee on a 'Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,' COM (2003) 104 Final, 4.7.2 (Mar.
2004) availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:
080:0148:0155:EN:PDF; Commission of the European Communities, European
Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM (2004) 373 Final, 25 (May 2004), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0373:FIN:EN:PDF. For scientific analysis of the
neighborhood policy see, for example, Youri Borko, Russia and the EU in the 21st Century:
FourPossible Scenarios of Relations, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra
note 9, at 297; Sandra Lavenex, A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood
Policy: Integration Beyond Conditionality?, 15 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 938 (2008); Dmitrijs
Nemirovskis, Small But Precious: The Actual and PotentialDirect Effect of the Partnershipand
CooperationAgreement Between the European Communities and the Russian Federation, 9 EUR.
J. L. REFORM 553 (2007); Stephen White, Ian McAllister & Margot Light, Enlargement
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III. OUTLOOK AND SUGGESTIONS
The EU is a not only a "Community based on the rule of
law," 1 28 it is a Community based only or at least primarily on "rule
of law." The EU neither has a network of EU or federal courts
across the Member States like we find in the United States, nor
its own administrative agencies and officials. With very narrow
exceptions in competition law and anti-dumping, the EU relies
on national legislatures and administrations to implement its law
and it relies on national courts to oversee that implementation. 129 The EU Commission and the Court of Justice can only
perform very limited services as overseers of that national implementation. I would go as far as to say that without adequate implementation and enforcement of EU law by the national authorities, there is not only a problem, there is no longer an EU.
Without adequate implementation and enforcement on the national level, European Union becomes European disunion and
then European history. Consequently, the EU needs "rule of
law" a lot more than it needs, for example, an internal market.
The European Union can exist without an internal market but it
cannot and does not exist without "rule of law." Therefore, the
European Commission, instead of or at least in addition to the
1995 White Paper "Preparation of the Associated Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal
Market of the Union"'130 should have adopted a strategy and
White Paper "Preparation for Participation of the CEECs in a
Community Based on Rule of Law." Such a Paper and strategy
are now thirteen years overdue. The closing paragraphs of the
present Article shall be devoted to some suggestions-more as
bullet points than elaborated arguments-for such a strategy.
(1) On the level of constitutional reform of the CEECs, the
and the New Outsiders, 40J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 135 (2002); as well as a special issue

of the EuropeanJournal of Law Reform dedicated to the topic of Approximation of Laws
by non-EU Countries to the EU Acquis, Special Issue Approximation to EU Law, 9 EUR.
J. L. REFORM 357 (2007).
128. See supra, notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
129. See Tanja A. Bdrzel, Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commmision, in 6 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY

197 (Tanja A. B6rzel et al. eds., 2003).
130. See Commission of the European Communities, Preparation of the Associated
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of
the Union: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (95)
163 Final (May 1995).
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EU should provide model clauses for the reform countries to be
integrated into their constitutions. One article should clearly
spell out the supremacy of EU law over national law,' 3 1 and another should promulgate the three and a half essential principles of "rule of law," namely the requirement of legal basis, the
requirement of legality, the requirement of effective judicial review and the principle of administrative liability. Such a constitutional amendment would solve the problem currently faced by
a number of constitutional courts in the region which must
often set aside unclear constitutional provisions to secure
supremacy of EU law.13 2 And it would provide the ultimate endorsement of "rule of law" over rule of anybody or anything else.
(2) On the level of legislative reform of the CEECs, a number of model clauses should be suggested for the law on the
courts and the law on administrative procedure. The essential
principles of "rule of law," as outlined in the preceding paragraph, should be incorporated and fleshed out in both of these
national laws. The law on the courts should also include provisions about equality of arms of the parties before the courts but,
more importantly, about adequate reasons to be provided for
every judgment. The best way of making such a requirement
operational is to provide for the automatic overruling and return
for new examination and decision of any judgment that is not
logically supported by its reasoning. Last but not least, all judgments must be published and accessible for critical review by the
media and the interested public. The latter principle is as important as the requirement that hearings should normally be
public, which we take rather for granted. The law on administrative procedure, furthermore, should ideally provide for an internal review procedure for administrative decisions analogous to
1 33 Under this
the very successful German Widerspruchsverfahren.
131. And whilst we are at it, why not suggest also a clause that clarifies the relationship between international law, in particular the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with national law.
132. See Anneli Albi, Selected Judgments by CEE ConstitutionalCourts: Lessons on How
(Not) to Amend Constitutions?, 3 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL'Y 39 (2007).
133. The German Widerspruchsverfahren has its legal basis in Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGOI [Code of Administrative Procedure] Jan. 21, 1960, at §§ 68-73
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/vwgo/gesamt.
pdf. For further information see NIGEL G. FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAws 17475 (2d ed. 1996); FRIEDHELm HUFEN, VERWALTUNGSPROZESSRECHT (7th ed. 2008); HENNING JADE, VERWALTUNGSVERFAHREN,

WIDERSPRUCHSVERFAHREN,

VERWALTUNGSPROZESS
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procedure, anybody who is dissatisfied with an administrative decision or the unresponsiveness of the administration to a request
or application has to pass through an internal administrative review before being able to bring the matter before the courts.'
For best results, the review should be done by the next higher
level inside the administration and a time limit should be provided for that authority to provide a reasoned decision to the
applicant either rejecting or accepting the complaint. 1 35 Many
administrative mistakes can be rectified quickly and inexpensively with such a procedure. 36 At the very least, even if the applicant does not receive satisfaction, she receives a reasoned
opinion on the basis of which she can now decide whether or
not to take the matter to the courts.'3 7 Along a similar vein, the
countries which have not done so yet should be strongly encouraged to create ombuds-person positions and review procedures for complaints of arbitrary or inefficient behavior of administrative officials, including corrupt and similar improper
conduct.
(3) and (4) On the level of administrative and court reform
in CEECs, the EU and its various training and facility improvement programs have achieved much in practical terms. Unfortunately, the mindset of the administrators and judges is sometimes still lagging behind the modernization of their offices and
computers. I have written in detail about the practical problems
of retraining officials who have worked for decades under the
former Communist systems and may simply not be able to
change the way they work.'33 Although it may be difficult to
change some of these officials, it would be easy enough to improve the training methods and to provide added incentives for
the participants not only to attend but to obtain measurable and
demonstrated qualifications via exams and diplomas.
(5) Last but not least, on the level of legal education reform
in CEECs, the EU has done virtually nothing to help and the
(4th ed. 2006); WOLF-RuDIGER SCHENKE, VERWALTUNGSPROZESSRECHT 213-37 (11th ed.
2007); WOLF-RODIGER SCHENKE & FERDINAND 0. Kopp, VwGO KOMMENTAR (15th ed.
2007).
134. See FOSTER, supra note 133, at 174-75.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform, supra note 108, at 305-06.
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results are accordingly very mixed. "Reproducing Incompetence" is a slogan that has been used with regard to one of the
most venerable institutions in Central Europe, the Faculty of
Law of Charles University in Prague.1 3 9 This neglect by the West
and trial and error approach in the East is particularly dis-heartening because it means that we continue to graduate lawyers in
many places who carry in themselves, like an indelible genetic
code, the methodological incompetence of the Communist era.
Although it is true that the Member States have not conferred
any powers on the EU to adopt binding legislation in the area of
education, there should be no problem with the EU promoting
a set of best practice criteria to support the CEECs in their reform efforts. And indeed the models for promotion of excellence in higher education are not hard to find. The reader
needs to look no further than to the United States and the
United Kingdom where strict evaluation and accreditation procedures administered by external peers and professional organizations are constantly forcing the universities and (law) schools
to not only abide by the letter of the applicable laws but to pursue excellence via meritocratic hiring and promotion procedures, constant improvement of work and study conditions, administrations at the service of the students and the faculty, and
many other efforts. 4 ° The finest example for adaptation of such
a system in the CEECs can be found in Lithuania where today
three successful law schools are competing with three rather different philosophies and approaches to higher education after
having passed through a rigorous accreditation procedure relyThis is not
ing heavily on international experts and expertise.'
139. See Aviezer Tucker, Reproducing Incompetence: The Constitution of Czech Higher
Education, 9 E. EUR. CONST. R. 94, 94 (2000); see also Edi Spaho, Dire Straits: Albanian
Legal Education, 9 E. EUR. CONST. R. 90 (2000) (discussing problems with the Albanian
legal system in its post-communist era).
140. U.S. law schools must be accredited by the American Bar Association
("ABA"). See American Bar Association, Accreditation Process, http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/accreditation/acinfo.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). Lawyers practicing in the
United Kingdom must belong to one of four professional organizations called "inns of
court" which also set educational requirements. See Lincoln Inn's History, http://www.
lincolnsinn.org.uk/inns.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); see, e.g., Gray's Inn, http://www.
(last
graysinn.info/index.php?option=comcontent&task=section&id=38&Itemid=858
visited Nov. 1, 2008).
141. See Globalex, A Guide to the Lithuanian Legal System, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Lithuania.htm# 10._LegalEducation (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
For more information on the Lithuanian system of evaluation and accreditation of insti-
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rocket science but in light of the fact that higher education in
the EU, or rather on the European continent, has long given up
its claim to global leadership, 4 2 it should probably not surprise
that we cannot seem to get it right. Jean Monnet supposedly
said, "[i]f I were starting over, I would begin with culture."' 43 I
guess today he might well say he should have started with (legal)
education ....
Finally, if the approach suggested here should bear some
useful fruit in Central and Eastern Europe, it may well be worth
trying in other parts of the world, including but not limited to
the old and new neighbors of the EU.

tutions of higher education see Lithuanian Centre for Quality Assessment in Higher
Education, Rules of Quality Assessment for Institutions of Research and Higher Education, http://www.skvc.lt/old/wwwskvc/en/rules.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
142. Reference is made to the well known London Times World University Rankings. For the most recent edition see THE TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPPLEMENT & QUAGQUARELLI SYMONDS, WORLD UNIvERsrrY RANKINGS 4 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://

www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/Magazines/THES/graphics/WorldRankings2007.
pdf. Among the 200 top universities in the world, we find no less than fifty-seven U.S.
and thirty-two U.K. universities, including twenty of the world's top twenty-five universities, whereas not a single continental European institution even made it into the top
twenty-five. Id.
143. "Si c'tait a refaire,je commenverais par la culture." Both the French original and
the English translation are here taken fromJunT, supra note 2, at 701. Professor Henri
Rieben, the founder and long term director of the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe
and hence in a way the top curator of the personal archives ofJean Monnet and Robert
Schuman, once told me that the quote is probably apocryphal. However, as our Italian
friends would say, si non vero, e ben trovato (if it's not true, it's well invented).

